News
SAN reacts to deregistration of ADC, others
A Senior Advocate of Nigeria and policy analyst, Dr. M. O. Ubani, has questioned the legal basis of a recent Federal High Court judgment directing the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to deregister five political parties, arguing that the decision may have extended beyond the position previously established by the Supreme Court.
In a legal commentary titled “Deregistration of Political Parties: Has the Court Gone Beyond the Supreme Court’s Position?”, Ubani said the ruling has reignited debate over the interpretation and application of Section 225A of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which empowers INEC to deregister political parties that fail to meet specified constitutional thresholds.
The judgment ordered INEC to deregister the African Democratic Congress (ADC), Action Alliance (AA), All Progressives Party (APP), Accord Party, and Zenith Labour Party (ZLP).
Ubani noted that the Supreme Court had earlier considered INEC’s powers under Section 225A in National Unity Party (NUP) & Anor v. INEC and related appeals arising from the commission’s 2020 deregistration exercise. According to him, while the apex court affirmed the constitutionality of Section 225A and upheld INEC’s authority to deregister non-performing political parties, it did not conclusively determine whether such powers could be judicially compelled by third parties.
“The critical question before the Supreme Court in those cases was principally whether INEC possessed the constitutional competence to deregister political parties. The Court answered that question in the affirmative,” he stated.
He argued, however, that the Supreme Court did not definitively address whether INEC’s power becomes a mandatory obligation enforceable through court action initiated by private individuals or organisations, or whether the electoral body retains some administrative discretion in assessing compliance with constitutional requirements.
According to Ubani, although Section 225A uses the word “shall” in relation to deregistration, its implementation presupposes that INEC must first determine whether a political party has failed to satisfy the prescribed thresholds relating to representation and electoral performance.
“The constitutional design therefore places INEC not merely as a passive executor of constitutional directives, but as the primary evaluator of compliance,” he said.
The senior lawyer expressed concern that courts could be seen as substituting their judgment for that of a constitutionally empowered institution if they compel INEC to act without the commission first making a formal determination of non-compliance.
He further pointed to reports suggesting that some of the affected political parties may not have violated the constitutional provisions relied upon in the judgment, arguing that such controversies underscore the need for INEC to conduct the initial evaluation.
Ubani also raised questions over the issue of locus standi, noting that the suit was reportedly instituted by the Incorporated Trustees of the National Forum of Former Legislators.
He maintained that Nigerian jurisprudence generally requires claimants to demonstrate that their civil rights or obligations have been adversely affected before approaching the courts, except in limited circumstances involving fundamental rights enforcement or recognised public interest litigation.
“The critical inquiry therefore becomes: what legally cognisable injury did former legislators suffer by INEC’s alleged failure to deregister political parties?” he asked.
According to him, civic concern or a desire to ensure constitutional compliance does not automatically confer legal standing under the traditional doctrine of locus standi.
Ubani argued that this jurisdictional issue should have received careful judicial consideration before the substantive aspects of the case were determined.
He also highlighted concerns regarding the balance between judicial oversight and institutional independence, stressing that while INEC’s actions are subject to judicial review, courts have traditionally exercised restraint in directing how constitutionally assigned powers should be exercised, except in cases involving illegality, bad faith, abuse of power, or refusal to act.
“The present judgment appears to proceed on the assumption that once the constitutional conditions under Section 225A are alleged to have been met, INEC is under an immediate and judicially enforceable obligation to deregister the affected parties at the instance of third-party litigants,” he observed.
Ubani warned that such an approach could blur the distinction between constitutional authority, administrative determination, and judicial intervention.
He suggested that appellate courts, including the Supreme Court if the matter reaches that stage, may need to clarify whether Section 225A imposes a self-executing duty on INEC or one that arises only after the commission has undertaken its own institutional assessment.
He said the courts may also have to determine whether the claimants possessed the requisite standing to institute the action and whether the relief granted amounted to an impermissible substitution of INEC’s administrative discretion.
While acknowledging that the Supreme Court had affirmed the constitutional framework for party deregistration, Ubani maintained that important questions concerning standing, judicial compulsion, and the limits of court intervention in INEC’s functions remain unresolved.
He called for broader legal and intellectual engagement on the issue, warning that increasing judicial interventions in the political sphere could have significant implications for Nigeria’s democratic landscape.
“The appellate courts may once again be called upon to define the proper constitutional boundaries between electoral regulation, administrative discretion, and judicial oversight,” he stated.